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The Explanatory Role of Computation in Cognitive Science

∗

Nir Fresco

Abstract. This paper deals with the question: which notion of computation (if any) is
essential for explaining cognition? Five answers are discussed in the paper.
1. The classicist answer: symbolic (digital) computation is required for explaining
cognition.
2. The broad digital computationalist answer: digital computation broadly construed is
required for explaining cognition.
3. The connectionist answer: sub-symbolic computation is required for explaining
cognition.
4. The computational neuroscientist answer: neural computation (that, strictly, is neither
digital nor analogue) is required for explaining cognition.
5. The extreme dynamicist answer: computation is not required for explaining cognition.
The first four answers are only accurate to a first approximation. But the “devil” is in the
details. The last answer cashes in on the parenthetical “if any” in the question above. The
classicist argues that cognition is symbolic computation. But digital computationalism need
not be equated with classicism. Indeed, computationalism can, in principle, range from digital
(and analogue) computationalism through (the weaker thesis of) generic computationalism to
(the even weaker thesis of) digital (or analogue) pancomputationalism. Connectionism, which
has traditionally been criticised by classicists for being non-computational, can be plausibly
construed as being either analogue or digital computationalism (depending on the type of
connectionist networks used). Computational neuroscience invokes the notion of neural
computation that may (possibly) be interpreted as a sui generis type of computation. The
extreme dynamicist argues that the time has come for a post-computational cognitive science.
This paper is an attempt to shed some light on this debate by examining various conceptions
and misconceptions of (particularly digital) computation.
1

Introduction

There is currently considerable confusion and disarray about just how we should view
computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism as explanatory frameworks in cognitive
science. In this paper, I endeavour to shed some light on the degree to which they are in
This is a preprint of the article appearing in Minds & Machines. It is reproduced with the permission of
Springer-Verlag. The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11023-0129286-y. This article has been superseded by Chapter 8 of “Physical Computation and Cognitive Science”
(http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-41375-9_8).
∗

conflict versus their degree of overlap, on whether they are explanatory or merely descriptive,
on which levels of analysis they belong to and on their explanatory posits. Since, by and
large, this task is conceptually laden, it is taken primarily from a philosophical point of view.
An important distinction that should be drawn in this context is between the conceptual issue
of how computation is best characterised and the empirical issue of how cognition is best
explained.
On the one hand, as regards the empirical issue, classicism, connectionism and
dynamicism are not in competition. A single system might be correctly modelled within each
one of these paradigms. It is also even possible that all of them include some form of
computation simpliciter (insofar as dynamicists are willing to accept it as being explanatorily
relevant). So, in this sense, the three paradigms may explanatorily coexist, if within each
paradigm the same system is modelled in different ways. Still, this implies that within
dynamicism models of the cognitive phenomena in question are also made available.
On the other hand, viewed from a different perspective, they are in conflict. Either the
bulk of cognitive phenomena are best explained symbolically or they are not. And if they are
best explained symbolically, then a particular form of (digital) computation will indeed be
central. This was the crux of the classicist-connectionist debate in the late 80’s and
throughout the 90’s. Further, either the bulk of cognitive phenomena are best explained in a
disembodied/non-embedded manner or they are not. Here enters the extreme dynamicist to
the debate denouncing the computationalist and connectionist explanatory efforts.
Moreover, the concept of computation is ill-understood and it is the source of an ongoing
conflict among the central paradigms in cognitive science. This conflict stems from an
equivocation on the notion of computation simpliciter. Computation is invoked differently by
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broad digital computationalism, connectionism and computational neuroscience with varying
degrees of success. It is not just the dichotomy between analogue and digital computation that
is the basis for this equivocation, but also the diversity of extant interpretations of digital
computation. Analogue computation has received even less attention in the literature, and
much like its digital counterpart, it remains equivocal. Some observations are also made in
the paper regarding how the precise characterisation of ‘analogue computation’ varies among
different authors. Still, my focus here is on concrete digital computation (i.e., as it is
actualised in physical computing systems).
Two main arguments are presented throughout this paper. First, a blanket dismissal of the
key role computation plays in cognitive science is unwarranted. For ‘computation’ is an
ambiguous concept and is invoked differently across a range of research programs in
cognitive science. And whilst some accounts of concrete digital computation proper are
untenable, others remain plausible and have important implications for the explanatory
paradigms that are underpinned by them.
Second, the idea that computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism are mutually
exclusive is wrong. For computationalism can be narrowly construed as classicism, but also
more

broadly

as

digital

computationalism,

generic

computationalism

or

even

pancomputationalism (and also as analogue computationalism). Further, connectionism is
compatible with generic computationalism, since it may be classified as either digital or
analogue computationalism, depending on the type of neural nets used. Digital
computationalism and connectionism make available mechanistic models of the cognitive
phenomena in question. But dynamicism proper is not on a par with either connectionism or
digital computationalism, as it does not (necessarily) offer a mechanistic explanation.
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The paper proceeds as follows in reply to the question of which notion of computation
simpliciter is essential for explaining cognition. In Section 2, I make some observations
concerning representations in cognitive science and the type of representations that plays a
role in computing systems proper. Subsequently, in Section 3, the classicist stance is
reviewed and then compared with broader versions of computationalism: digital
computationalism, generic computationalism and pancomputationalism based on the chosen
construal of computation. In Section 4, I show how (pace classicists) connectionism is an
important variant of computationalism. Section 5 examines the role that computation plays in
computational neuroscience. In Section 6, I explore the non-computational shift promoted by
extreme dynamicists, who dismiss the key role computation should play in cognitive science.
Section

7

addresses

the

mechanistic

versus

non-mechanistic

debate

and

how

computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism figure in that debate.
2

Representations in Cognitive Science

Since the following discussion revolves around representations as they figure in the
philosophy of mind, but supposedly also in computation proper, a brief digression is required
to briefly examine them. When the mind is viewed as being involved in coordinating the
behavior of a cognitive agent in its environment, one plausible strategy is to view some of its
internal states and processes as carrying information about or standing in for those relevant
aspects of its body and external states of affairs in negotiating its environment (Bechtel
1998a: p. 297). Mental representations function as Stand-Ins for objects or events outside the
cognitive agent and once the agent obtains those representations, it can operate on them
rather than needing the actual objects or events (Fodor 1980).
Mental representations have two important features, namely being physically realisable
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and being intentional. The first feature implies that they have causal powers. And being
intentional, mental representations convey meaning or content. This characterisation
presupposes a distinction between the vehicle (a physical state or structure, such as a string of
symbols) and its content. The issue concerning the admissible vehicles of representation
remains highly controversial (Egan 2011), yet it is common in computational cognitive
science to assume that these vehicles are computational structures or states in the brain (von
Eckardt 1993: pp. 168-169).
Moreover, there are two main approaches in computational cognitive science to the
interpretation of representational vehicles. According to classicism, complex data structures
(formally construed) constitute the representational vehicles of our mental representations.
According to connectionism, the representational vehicles are either local, in which case they
are attributed to individual activated units, or distributed, in which case they are attributed to
sets of activated units (von Eckardt 1993: pp. 169, 176). Whilst the main motivation for
taking the classicist’s data structures to be the bearers of representational content is their
compositionality-enabling structure, connectionist networks do not straightforwardly exhibit
such structure.
Also, an important distinction to be drawn regarding mental representations in this
context is between processes operating on representations and representations figuring in
processes (Bechtel 1998a: pp. 299-300). The ‘operating on representations’ alternative gives
rise to the interpretation of representations as static data structures awaiting some operation to
be performed on them. On the other hand, the ‘representation figuring in processes’
alternative allows for representations to change dynamically. The former alternative is the
basis for the classicist thesis, where representations, which have a propositional format, are
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operated on by explicit language-like rules. Still, arguably in connectionist networks
distributed representations figure in activation-spreading processes and change dynamically.
However, in the context of accounts of (digital) computation proper, a further distinction
should be drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic representations. We should distinguish what
computer scientists call formal semantics from real-world semantics invoked by philosophers
(White 2011: p. 194). An intrinsic representation in a digital computing system is “confined”
to the physical boundaries of that system (and has some formal semantics), whilst an extrinsic
one (which has real-world semantics) is not. Internal symbols, for example, are intrinsic
representations, whose referents are also internal to the computing system. So, both the
representer (e.g., a symbol or a string) and the representee (e.g., a memory register or an
instruction) reside within the physical boundaries of the computing system. Internal reference
to symbols and expressions in conventional digital computers is assigned and it is a primitive
in the computer’s architecture. Further, symbols in programming languages have formal
semantics that is given by the semantics of those languages (ibid: p. 191).
Any semantics of intrinsic representations is confined to the physical boundaries of the
computer1. This semantics interprets the primitives of the computer language as actions on
the (somewhat abstracted) internal state of the computing system (ibid: p. 194). An example
of an intrinsic representation is the primitive ADD operation in digital computers. It is
1

This claim raises some ontological quandaries about semantics being confined to some physical boundaries.
To avoid a metaphysical debate, let me clarify. In conventional digital computers, computer programs are
translated into machine language, which drives the operation of the computer at the hardware level. Take the
following code example in assembly (a low-level programming language that works very close to the hardware
level).
__asm__ ( “movl $2, %eax;”
“movl $25, %ebx;”
“imull %ebx, %eax;”)
This instruction tells the computer to multiply 2 and 25 and store the result into register %eax. The end result
might represent, say, a total of 50 apples for a field trip of 25 children. But that makes no difference to the
execution of the instruction above. The semantics of that instruction (i.e., moving data between registers,
multiplying values, etc.) is contained within the boundaries of the computer.
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described as a numerical opcode in the machine language, which is interpreted by the system
as standing in for or representing the ADD operation itself. This may invite the challenge that
an interpretation by the computing system implies that it has knowledge of that instruction.
But this is hardly the case in human-engineered computing systems. A reply to this challenge
requires a further distinction between know-how and know-that. Crudely put, the former is
implicit knowledge, which is typically based on heuristics, whereas the latter is explicit and
consists of propositional knowledge. Some have argued that know-how, such as how to ride a
bike, how to play a piano, etc., “cannot be analyzed in terms of abilities, dispositions and so
on; rather, there appears to be an irreducible cognitive element” (Chomsky 1992: p. 104,
italics added). Or in other words, know-how requires know-that.
Yet, others have argued that not all know-how consists of propositional knowledge. “[I]f,
for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation [of considering
appropriate propositions] had first to be performed […], it would be a logical impossibility
for anyone ever to break into the circle” (Ryle 1949: p. 31). Instead, know-how is construed
as a skilled performance of an operation that is measured by it success, efficiency, etc. (ibid:
p. 29). Still, some researchers have insisted that know-how always consists of propositional
knowledge (Stanley and Williamson 2001).
The plot thickens, but we need not go that far. To execute the primitive ADD operation,
the CPU follows the opcode direction to the physical address of ADD. And the ADD
operation itself is simply a hardwired mechanism2 that converts input bits to output bits using
some combination of logic gates. Put another way, the ADD operation is coded by a unique
2

If, for some technical reasons, this mechanism is replaced with a soft-wired mechanism (i.e., either through
explicit how-to rules or a soft-constraint learning mechanism), the overall principle will still hold. Even in
the case of the soft-constraint learning mechanism, it will eventually learn (say, by heuristics) how to
perform effectively without knowing what it is doing.
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binary pattern and whenever this particular sequence lands in the CPU’s instruction register,
it is akin to a dialled telephone number that mechanically opens up the lines to the right
special-purpose circuit (Dennett 1991: p. 214). The CPU’s “know-how” requires no “knowthat” of the ADD operation.
On the other hand, extrinsic representations refer to symbols, data or objects that exist
outside the physical boundaries of the computing system. Unlike their intrinsic counterparts,
extrinsic representations are external-knower-dependent: a knower assigns external (or realworld) semantics to data structures, strings or symbols. The contents of some data structures
or computer programs may have external semantics relating to some states of affairs when the
computing system directly interacts with the environment in which it is embedded. Still, the
computer program will perform, say, the same database search operation (if prompted) just as
well, even if the strings of symbols searched for were the names of planets (rather than, say,
names of employees) and the corresponding numerals were their coordinates in the galaxy
(rather than, say, salaries of employees)3.
3

Computationalism

3.1

A narrow construal – classicism, and symbolic computation

The classicist thesis is that cognition is symbolic computation. Zenon Pylyshyn claims that
the idea that “certain behavioural regularities can be attributed to different representations
(some of which are called beliefs […]) and to symbol-manipulating processes operating over
these representations” is fundamental to cognitive science (1999: p. 10). Similarly, John

3

At the program level, any factual information entered by a user is converted into something recognisable by
the computing system by using an implicit semantics dictionary. This dictionary is used to translate any
factual information into some data structure that is recognisable by the program. The ace of hearts card, for
instance, is translated into a data structure with properties such as a shape, a number, etc. This data structure
can be processed by the program and when appropriate, the processed data can be translated back into some
form of human readable information as output.
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Haugeland claimed that “thinking and computing are radically the same” (1985: p. 2) and that
“an intelligent system must contain some computational subsystems […] to carry out […]
internal manipulations” (1985: p. 113, italics added).
Let us pause briefly to consider two similar accounts of concrete computation that
underpin the classicist view, according to which digital computation is interpreted as
program–controlled symbol manipulation. The first one is the formal symbol manipulation
(FSM, for short) account, which is nicely summarised by Jerry Fodor. “[Digital] computation
is a causal chain of computer states and the links in the chain are operations on semantically
interpreted formulas in a machine code” (Fodor 1981: p. 122). Fodor, Pylyshyn and
Haugeland subscribe to the FSM account (though they diverge on some of the particulars).
According to this account, a physical system performs digital computation when it processes
semantically interpreted (not just interpretable) symbols (Pylyshyn 1984: pp. 62, 72). Digital
computing systems manipulate symbol tokens, which are representations of the subject matter
the computation is about, in accordance with some purely formal principles.
The second relevant account of concrete computation in this context is the physical
symbol systems (PSS, for short) account. Its main champions were Allen Newell and Herbert
Simon. According to this account, digital computing systems just are (universal) physical
symbol systems containing sets of interpretable and combinable entities (i.e., symbols) and a
set of processes that operate on these entities by generating, copying, modifying, combining
and destroying them according to instructions. These symbols are physical patterns (i.e.,
tokens) that can occur as components of symbol structures (Newell and Simon 1976: p. 116).
The resemblance to the FSM account is clear. Newell and Simon argued that “[a] physical
symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action” (ibid).
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Undoubtedly, classicists are committed to the idea that cognitive capacities are
underpinned by mental representations. They insist that the combinatorial structure and
compositionality of mental representations is critical for our cognitive capacities (Fodor and
Pylyshyn 1988: pp. 17-18). Fodor claims that mental processes are operations defined on
syntactically structured mental representations, much like sentences in natural language
(1981). Pylyshyn adds that “[w]hat makes it possible for […] intelligent organisms to behave
in a way that is correctly characterised in terms of what they represent (say, beliefs and goals)
is that representations are encoded in a system of physically instantiated symbolic codes”
(1999: p. 5, italics original).
In short, classicism is a narrow conception of digital computationalism. It is committed to
a symbolic model of cognition consisting of at least two levels. Physical symbol systems are
describable at two levels: the symbol level and the physical level. Newell asserted that
symbol structures and operators4 on these structures (at the symbol or program level) are
realisable in physical mechanisms (1980: p. 156). Pylyshyn proposes a tripartite
decomposition of cognitive systems (akin to David Marr’s tripartite analysis5). At the
top/semantic level, knowledge and goals as well as certain behaviours of the cognitive system
are attributed to different representations and the processes operating on them respectively.
At the middle/symbol level, symbolic expressions encode the semantic content of the
system’s knowledge and goals. At the bottom/physical level, representation-governed
behaviour of the entire system is implemented by some biological substrate (Pylyshyn 1993,
1999: pp. 7-11).
4
5

Operators (such as ‘+’, ‘-‘, or ‘copy’) are symbols or symbolic expressions that have an external semantics
built into them (Newell 1980: p. 159).
The semantic level, for example, is sometimes equated with Marr’s top/computational level, but it should not
be. Marr’s top level characterises the function computed by the cognitive system. This computation may (but
need not) involve the assignment of semantic contents.
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It is easy to see then why classicists invoke computation-theoretic language to explain
cognition. In the light of the above, the great flexibility of program-controlled digital
computers makes them ideal models of cognitive agents performing complex tasks in virtue
of language-processing-like operations. By endorsing either the FSM or PSS accounts of
computation, classicists can easily appeal to existing computational architectures and related
tools to explain cognitive phenomena. Yet, they also insist on a too narrow class of digital
computing systems and impose an extrinsic representational constraint on computation
proper6.
3.2

Broad construals of computationalism, and digital computation

How broadly can we construe computationalism? The short answer is: it depends. The
classical dichotomy of computation simpliciter is between digital and analogue computation.
Even if we took computation to be just digital computation, we would still be left with many
versions of digital computationalism depending on the particular account of computation that
we endorsed. Broad digital computationalism is certainly more encompassing than
classicism, which posits a narrow class of digital computing systems. A classicist, who
subscribes to the FSM account, takes physical computing systems to be program-controlled
digital computers. Her fellow classicist, who subscribes to the PSS account, takes physical
computing systems to be programmable stored-program digital computers.
Importantly, different accounts of digital computation entail different versions of broad
digital computationalism. For example, according to the view endorsed by John Searle (1990)
and Hilary Putnam (1988), every sufficiently complex physical system (trivially) performs
digital computation. This view inevitably leads to strong digital pancomputationalism, for
6

This imposed representational constraint is unsurprising, as the motivation of the classicists, who promote the
FSM and PSS accounts, was advancing a substantive empirical hypothesis about how human cognition works.
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rocks, chairs, paper clips, oranges, humans and the physical universe – all digitally compute.
It is not only that every sufficiently complex physical system computes some Turingcomputable function (i.e., weak digital pancomputationalism), but rather that the system
computes every Turing-computable function. This version of digital pancomputationalism is
hardly illuminating. More precisely, it is an anti-realist version of pancomputationalism. It
does not tell us that the universe has a particular structure, but it is rather invoked to argue
against cognition being computational in any substantial sense (Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller
2011: p. 154). It stems from the anti-realist view that it is merely our subjective description
that makes a physical system computational.7
However, we need not go so far as to promote digital pancomputationalism, to be able to
endorse a digital computationalist thesis that is broader than classicism. Subscribing to some
of the other extant accounts of concrete digital computation, which do not appeal to extrinsic
representations, leads to a broader digital computationalist thesis. For example, according to
the mechanistic account of computation, a physical system performs digital computation, if it
manipulates input strings of digits8, depending on the digits’ type and their location in the
string, in accordance with a rule defined over the strings (and possibly the system’s internal
states) (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011: p. 8).
The resulting digital computationalist thesis, which is based on the mechanistic account, is
broader than the classicist thesis. On this account, digital computing systems are individuated
by their functional properties that are specified mechanistically without invoking any
7

Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic asserts that to make pancomputationalism a substantial thesis that plays a key role in
a scientific theory about the universe, we should adopt a realist weak version of pancomputationalism (DodigCrnkovic and Müller 2011: pp. 154-155). All processes can be described as computational processes, since such
a description happens to be useful in a scientific theory. It is ‘weak’ in the sense that it focuses on ways of
description, rather than on realist ontology.
8
A digit, on this account, is a stable state of a component that is processed by the computing system. In ordinary
electronic computers digits are states of physical components of the machine (e.g., memory cells).
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extrinsic representations (Piccinini 2008a). Further, unlike the FSM and PSS accounts of
computation, it is not restricted only to symbolic computation. Relevant digital computing
systems, on the mechanistic account, range from special-purpose TMs and special-purpose
computers through universal TMs, programmable stored-program systems, Gandy machines9
and discrete neural networks to (the contentious) hypercomputers. Any one of these systems
has its own pros and cons as an adequate model of cognition. Still, the point is that the
resulting digital computationalist thesis is more encompassing than the classicist thesis.
There are other accounts of computation that neither presuppose any extrinsic
representational vehicles nor restrict the class of digital computation to the class of symbolic
computation. Such accounts include the algorithm execution account and Robin Gandy’s
account (of parallel computation). How ‘algorithm’ is interpreted affects the resulting
algorithm execution account10. For the purposes of this paper, we adopt Jack Copeland’s
account, according to which a physical system performs digital computation when it acts in
accordance with an algorithm (1996). He defines an algorithm, Al, as a finite set of
instructions such that, for some computing system, CS, each instruction of Al calls for one or
more primitive operations of CS to be performed, either unconditionally or if specific
conditions, recognisable by CS, are met (Copeland 1997: p. 696).
Moreover, a key feature of his account alluding to representations is the “labelling
scheme” requirement (ibid: p. 338). The labelling scheme of CS consists of two parts, the
9

A Gandy machine is a deterministic discrete machine that can perform operations in parallel. It can be
conceptualised as multiple TMs working in parallel, sharing the same tape and possibly writing on
overlapping regions of it.
10
It is worth noting that Robert Cummins, for instance, also holds the view that digital computation is the
execution of algorithms (or programs), but his view does presuppose extrinsic representations. “[B]eing able
to track computations under their semantic interpretations allows us to see how a physical engine – a
computer – can satisfy epistemic constraints” (Cummins 1996: p. 66). But his account of computation proper
is ultimately inadequate for other reasons as well. On his account, Searle’s wall also computes (Copeland
1996: p. 353).
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designation of certain parts of CS as label-bearers and the method for specifying the label
borne by each label-bearing part at any given time. Yet, this designation is limited to intrinsic
representations of numbers, functions and computing instructions. On this account, digital
computation is not limited to symbolic computation, and it includes any system that acts in
accordance with an algorithm, such as special- and general-purpose digital computers, TMs
and finite state automata. Accordingly, the resulting digital computationalist thesis in this
case is that cognition is algorithmic computation that need not be symbolic.
Gandy’s account also gives rise to a broad digital computationalist thesis. According to
this account, a physical system performs digital computation when it goes through a sequence
of state transitions whose input is encoded as the system’s initial state, and each one of its
states is its output at a given time (1980: p. 127). On this account, labels designate “the
various parts of the machine – e.g., […] a transistor and its electrodes [… but also] positions
in space (e.g., for squares of the tape of a Turing machine) and […] physical attributes (e.g.,
[…] the symbol on a square)” (ibid). Yet, this designation need not involve any extrinsic
representation. Further, Gandy’s account encompasses parallel digital computation by
violating Turing’s boundedness condition. The resulting computationalist digital thesis is
broader than the classicist thesis, and it is prima facie more biologically plausible, given what
neuroscience tells us about the parallel neural activity in the brain.
Computationalism may be further extended beyond digital computationalism. If
‘computation’ is taken as generic computation, then we get the broadest version of
computationalism (that is not digital pancomputationalism). Generic computation includes
digital computation, analogue computation, quantum computation and neural computation. It
is characterised as the processing of medium-independent vehicles according to rules

14

allowing for the processing of continuous variables, strings of digits, or neuronal spike trains
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011: p. 10-13). Generic computationalism is the thesis that
cognition is computation in a generic sense. It does not amount to pancomputationalism
though. It is a plausible (but weak) explanatory framework and still falsifiable (e.g., if it
turned out that cognitive capacities depended inherently on some particular physical
properties).
In sum, computationalism should not be identified with classicism. The latter is but one
digital computationalist alternative positing a narrow class of digital computing systems as
candidate models of cognition. How broadly computationalism should be construed depends
on the particular account of computation invoked. Choosing the right account is no easy task.
The discussion thus far still leaves out the analogue computationalism alternative, which is
based on analogue computation. This alternative is less common in cognitive science and it is
discussed in the next section.
4

Connectionism and Sub-symbolic Computation

The connectionist thesis is that cognition is sub-symbolic computation. Accordingly,
cognition should be explained by neural network activity (in a more generic sense than the
association between stimuli and responses). Modern connectionists argue that these neural
networks11 perform sub-symbolic computation (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986; Smolensky

11

Neural (or connectionist) networks consist of multiple interconnected homogenous units called ‘neurons’.
These nets can be classified into two general categories: feedforward nets and feedback (or recurrent) nets.
In the former case, units are arranged across multiple layers such that the output of units in one layer
depends only on those in previous layers. The outputs of units are updated layer by layer with the first one
being the input layer and the last one being the output layer. In the latter case, feedback loops in the network
allow signals between units to travel in both directions (rather than just in a unidirectional forward manner).
A source of controversy arises in regard to representations in connectionist nets. On the localist
interpretation, each individual unit, which is active in a particular distributed activation pattern, realises an
individual representation contributing to the overall content of the activation pattern. On the distributive
interpretation, a representation is realised by either by an activation pattern or an activation pattern and its
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1988; Smolensky and Legendre 2006; Chalmers 1992; MacLennan 2001). Under this
interpretation, it is implicit that neural nets are capable of computations that are not limited to
discrete manipulations of symbolic representations. In a sharp contrast to classicism, most
connectionists reject the claim that a language of thought is required for an adequate
explanation of cognition. This makes the tension between connectionism so construed and
classicism obvious. Some have explicitly advanced the thesis that neural nets are analogue
computers (Diederich 1990; O’Brien 1999; O’Brien and Opie 2006). Others have restricted
the classification of neural nets as analogue computers to a certain kind of networks,
primarily those that process real-valued quantities (Siegelmann 1999; Kremer 2007).
Moreover, according to Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie, connectionism is grounded in
analogue computation, for neural nets “compute by exploiting relations of structural
resemblance between their connection weights and their target domains” (2006: p. 41). On
their view, “[a]nalog computers are systems whose behaviour is driven […] by semantically
‘active’ analog representations that physically or structurally resemble what they represent”
(ibid: p. 33). It follows, by their lights, that neural networks are analogue computers. The
representational vehicle invoked in a connectionist analysis is based on a structural
isomorphism between the network’s activation patterns and the task domain. This
isomorphism renders the shape of the activation landscape semantically significant (ibid: pp.
32-34; O’Brien 1999).
If they are right, then connectionism is a variant of analogue computationalism, that is, the
thesis that cognition is analogue computation. But, as already mentioned above, the notion of
analogue computation is also equivocal. According to O’Brien and Opie, analogue
weighted connections. For further discussion on neural networks see, for example, John Tienson’s
introduction (1988).
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computation is defined over analog representations. When Hava Siegelmann invokes this
notion, she refers to computation performed by a very specific type of recurrent neural
networks, which perform operations on real variables and allow loops among some of the
units (1999). Nevertheless, the most precise characterisation of analogue computation may be
attributed to the Shannon-Pour-El Thesis. According to this thesis, the outputs of generalpurpose analogue computers correspond exactly to differentially algebraic functions.
Therefore, there exists a universal analogue computer that using just a handful of integrators
can compute (to some arbitrary degree of approximation) any possible continuous function
(Rubel 1985: pp. 75-76). The main point is that analogue computation is a continuous change
of real variables over time.
Yet, there remain the questions whether analogue computation has to be defined over
representations and whether connectionist networks are rightly classified as analogue
computers. Analogue computers (and their processing units) have the function of
transforming an input real variable into an output real variable, which stands in some specific
functional relation to the input variable. Whilst their operations can also be understood in
terms of analogue representations, they need not be (Piccinini 2008b: p. 48). I have argued
elsewhere that connectionist computation is best classified as analogue computation without
invoking any extrinsic representational properties (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010).
However, this conclusion is too strong. There are certainly good reasons to classify discrete
neural nets, which process binary-valued or integer-valued quantities, as digital computing
systems (still without invoking any extrinsic representations). That would certainly be the
case, if we adopted, say, the mechanistic account of concrete digital computation.
Some connectionist networks perform digital computation, while others perform analogue
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computation. The idea of discrete binary networks goes back to the seminal 1943 paper by
Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. On their model, each neuron was modelled as a linear
threshold element with a binary output. This was the first model of a discrete neural net
exhibiting all-or-none firing patterns. When both the inputs and the outputs of such neural
nets are binary the result is a Boolean circuit (Siu et al. 1995: pp. 1-2). Since the McCulloch
and Pitts networks can be used to build digital computers, these (and similar discrete) neural
networks are best classified as digital computing systems12.
Incidentally, Daniel Dennett has pointed out that connectionist networks should not be
regarded as a “shift to some ‘qualitatively different’ mode of operation. [For] at the heart of
[the connectionist] system lies a von Neumann engine […] computing a computable
function” (1991: p. 269). I do not know whether Dennett meant it literally (or just
metaphorically). But if we analyse individual units of a discrete neural network as simple
physical computing systems, strictly they need not have von Neumann architecture.
For von Neumann architecture implies a general-purpose computing system, whereas
individual units of the neural network are special-purposed. John von Neumann and
colleagues argued that for the “device [to] be a general-purpose computing machine it should
contain certain main organs relating to arithmetic, memory-storage, [and] control” (Burks et
al 1946: p. 399). The arithmetic logic unit in the von Neumann architecture must be capable
of the basic elementary operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. But
each individual neural unit only performs addition and multiplication of all the weighted
connections leading to that particular unit. Besides, these units need not have any built in
memory for storing multiple instructions and other data. But perhaps most importantly, a
12

Otherwise, if McCulloch and Pitts networks were classified as analogue computing systems, then digital
computers would be analogue too.
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general-purpose computing system can be programmed to perform any function that some
special-purpose computing system can perform. Yet, each neural unit is a special-purpose
system, whose instruction is an integral part of that system and constitutes a part of its design
structure. Each unit can be described as either an IF-THEN equivalent (if threshold exceeded,
then “fire”) or a Boolean circuit (when its inputs and output are binary).
Furthermore, we can distinguish between two types of neural nets based on their
dynamics. According to the mechanistic account of computation, the first type of networks
takes strings of digits as inputs and outputs, has discrete dynamics and does not change its
structure over time. The second type of networks takes strings of digits as inputs and outputs,
but has continuous dynamics or changes over time (Piccinini 2008c). Whilst only the first
type belongs to the class of classical digital computing systems, both these types of neural
nets perform digital computation on the mechanistic account of computation.
Yet, there exists another class of neural nets, which process continuous real-valued
quantities, that do not perform digital computation. These networks turn their input into their
output in virtue of their continuous dynamics and do not compute by manipulating strings of
digits (ibid: p. 319). Continuous variables are not strings of digits and this suffices to rule out
these networks as digital computing systems in the sense of computation employed in
computer science. Nevertheless, these neural nets can be correctly classified as analogue
computers, for they satisfy the following five plausible criteria. First, the network’s
operations take a continuous range of values over time. Second, its physical dynamics are
governed by operations on real variables. Third, the functional relation between inputs and
outputs of the net is best described by a set of differential equations. Four, the network’s
inputs and outputs are distinguished from one another up to a limited degree of precision.
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Lastly, the net may be subject to varying levels of noise (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010).
Moreover, on other accounts of concrete digital computation, (discrete) neural nets do not
straightforwardly qualify as performing digital computation. Unsurprisingly, on both the
FSM and PSS accounts, connectionist networks do not compute, because they do not operate
algorithmically on structured symbolic representations. This has been the source of much
debate in the late 80’s and throughout the 90’s (for just the tip of the iceberg see, for example,
Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Smolensky 1991, 1995; Clark 1990; Chalmers 1993; Matthews
1997; Bechtel 2001). But interestingly, even on the algorithmic execution account above, it is
not immediately clear that discrete neural networks compute, for it is not obvious whether
they execute algorithms in the classical sense of computability theory. This may seem bizarre
at first, since neural nets are typically simulated on digital computers. But that is not the
point. The question is whether discrete neural nets perform digital computation not whether
they can be simulated on digital computers.
To answer this question one needs to judge (discrete) neural nets on their own merits as
stand-alone non-simulated systems. When a neural net is implemented as a physical
collection of interconnected simple processors (each one being an individual unit), it still
needs to be trained to perform its designated task. The most common method of doing that is
using the backpropagation learning procedure. Whilst this procedure can be described as

an algorithm in the classical sense used in computer science, it still does not imply that
connectionist computation is algorithmic.
Once the system is trained and performs its task successfully, the question remains:
does the network operate algorithmically? Connectionist networks do not operate by
following the same type of “hard” predefined rules that are programmed on conventional
20

digital computing systems13. Their operation can rather be described as the satisfaction of
soft-constraints, where each connection between two units represents a soft-constraint.
Whether a unit actually fires or not depends on a simple summation function of all the
weighted signals received by any particular unit. This activation is commonly known as a
spreading activation algorithm, where it is distributed over the network, based on some
mathematical function of the connections weights (Waltz and Pollack 1985: pp. 54-55).
Granted that connectionist networks compute, connectionism is (at least) a subclass of
generic computationalism. If discrete connectionist networks are sufficient for explaining
cognition, then connectionism (does not just overlap with, but) is a subclass of digital
computationalism14. If continuous neural nets are sufficient for explaining cognition, then
connectionism is a subclass of analogue computationalism. However, if the full range of
connectionist networks is required for explaining cognitive phenomena, then connectionism
is a subclass of generic computationalism. At any rate, on the preceding analysis, none of
these three options has to presuppose extrinsic representations for connectionist network
computation.
5

Computational Neuroscience, and Neural Computation

Already in the 90’s, but particularly in the past decade, computational modeling of cognition
has become an active area in neuroscience in an attempt to disclose how neurons give rise to
cognitive functions. This research program now wears the title computational neuroscience

13

14

By implementing soft constraints, connectionist networks arguably allow the task demands, rather than the
designer's biases (like in rule-driven digital computing systems) to be primary driver shaping the operation
of the network. To some extent, this approach reflects a shift in methodology when compared with Marr’s
classical top-down approach (which is overtly endorsed by classicists).
Still, this does not completely resolve the classicist main beef with connectionist networks, which do not
process structured symbolic representations. Fodor and Pylyshyn think that cognition is syntactically
governed manipulation of structured representations. Connectionism, so they conclude, is hopeless as a
(competence) theory of cognition (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010).
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and employs a broad range of techniques also using some tools from the domain of computer
science. It is worth noting that computational neuroscience should not be identified with
connectionism. The latter typically refers to models based on behavioural data, whereas the
former refers to models based on both behavioural and neuroscientific data. Besides, the
backpropagation method, which is typically used to train the system, depends on the units
being able to relay signals bi-directionally. However, the dendrites and axons, which act as
input and output channels to and from brain neurons typically allow nerve impulses to travel
in one direction only. And whilst individual units in connectionist networks are homogenous,
brain neurons are physiologically specialised.
Furthermore, computational neuroscience downplays the explanatory role of the standard
digital computer metaphor and connectionist networks in cognitive science. Computational
cognitive science attempts a fairly close integration of psychological, neurophysiological and
neurobiological data and theories of cognition (Boden 2008). Most existing connectionist
networks are hugely different from the anatomy of the brain. The units of connectionist
networks are computationally far too simple when compared with real neurons15, though
some attempts have been made to model brain neurons more faithfully (cf. the discussion
about models that do not impose the simplification or homogenisation of the computational
units in Maass and Markram 2004).
Moreover, Patricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowsky argue that Marr’s tripartite
computationalist analysis aligns poorly with the levels of organisation in the nervous system
(1992: pp. 18-19). On Marr’s analysis, the top-level competence function can be examined
independently of understanding the algorithm that is performed in the brain and similarly the
15

Of course, some degree of simplification is needed to make any model viable, since models, by definition,
abstract away from some of the particulars of the modelled system. The question here is whether
connectionist networks simplify too much in the process of modelling cognition.
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problem of discovering the algorithm at work is independent of its underlying physical
realisation. This top down approach makes neurobiological facts about the nervous system
less relevant, since they are just details at the implementation level. Later research in
computational neuroscience suggested that knowledge of the brain architecture plays a vital
role in understanding those “algorithms that have a reasonable shot at explaining how in fact
neurons do the job” (ibid: p .19).
Unlike digital computationalism, computational neuroscience studies cognition in a
bottom-up approach, whilst still being informed by top-down theories. Research from
neuropsychology, neuroethology and psychophysics provides the details about the relevant
lower level mechanisms. But lower level research remains incomplete in the absence of toplevel analyses of the very cognitive capacity, whose mechanisms are studied at the lower
level. Neuroscientific research can profit, for instance, from abstract discoveries in
computability theories and discoveries in the construction of physical computing systems
(ibid: pp. 11-12). Unlike other cognitive scientific research programs, neuroscience attempts
to do more than “merely reproduc[e …] a function of the brain (such as playing chess)”
whereas this may be sufficient in AI research (Eliasmith and Anderson 2003: p. 1). Yet, as
the name suggests, computational neuroscience is committed to the view that the brain is an
implemented computing system (Churchland et al. 1988; Churchland and Sejnowsky 1992;
Dayan and Abbott 2001; Eliasmith and Anderson 2003; Trappenberg 2010).
Nevertheless, computational neuroscience is not committed to cognition being either
symbolic computation or sub-symbolic computation, for that matter. Neurons are taken to be
computational units that process information to solve complex tasks, such as perception. But
what neuroscientists take ‘computation’ or ‘neural computation’ to be is another matter
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entirely. One approach is to agree that whilst there is no precise definition of the computation
performed in the brain, it certainly is broader than the notion of digital computation. They
take a physical computing system to be one whose physical states can be described as
representing states of some (other) systems, where transitions between states are operations
on representations (Churchland and Sejnowsky 1992: p. 61-62; Eliasmith 2003). More
specifically, neural computation amounts to the encoding and decoding of neural spike trains
(Eliasmith 2007: pp. 326-327).
Arguably, neural computation so characterised may be a sui generis type of computation.
This has been a recent thesis of some researchers, who argue that neuroscientific evidence
shows that, on the one hand, typical neural signals (e.g., spike rates) are continuous, yet, on
the other, these signals are constituted by spikes, which are discrete elements (Piccinini and
Bahar 2011). Whilst this thesis is not uncontentious, it is compatible with some other
characterisations of neural computation in neuroscience according to which neural
computation is neither digital computation nor analogue computation (Churchland et al 1988:
pp. 47-50; Eliasmith 2007: pp. 326-327; Poggio and Koch 1985). Others have proposed
natural computation as an alternative notion of computation that is more suitable for
describing the behaviour of biological systems (MacLennan 2004; Hamann and Wörn
2007)16. The claim that neural computation (as it is invoked in computational neuroscience) is
a sui generis type needs unpacking and I lack the space to discuss it further here.
6

Extreme Dynamicism and the Non-Computational Shift

Various “anti-representationalist” approaches are included under this heading starting with
“radical” dynamicism (e.g., Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder and Port 1995) through
For one thing, neural activity has many sources of noise making the underlying computation imprecise
sometimes. This suggests that, unlike digital computation, natural computation itself is noisy and imprecise
(MacLennan 2004: p. 129).
16
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embodied and embedded dynamicism (e.g., Pfeiffer and Scheier 1999) to the enactivist
approach (e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thomson 2007). Whilst there are important differences
amongst these approaches and grouping them together certainly does them an injustice by
blurring those differences, they all share a similar trait. They all reject representation and
computation as being key to understanding cognition.17 Instead, according to this new “postcognitivist” paradigm, cognition is not computational (Wallace et al. 2007: p. 26). This new
paradigm distances itself from both computationalism and connectionism by broadening
its research focus on the brain and including the body and its relationship to the “outside”
world. The purpose of my exposition here is to reveal any misconceptions about computation
and so specific details about the different approaches are omitted for brevity18.
An underlying claim of the extreme dynamicist approaches is that cognition is not
computational. Advocates of these approaches think that it is time for cognitive science to
embrace a non-computational paradigm. In the early 90’s, Rodney Brooks designed the
mobots, which were robots capable of functioning in a messy and unpredictable environment.
He claimed that these robots “do not have traditional AI representations […] which have any
semantics that can be attached to them” (Brooks 1991: p. 149)19. “Radical” dynamicists, Tim
van Gelder and Robert Port argued that “[t]he cognitive system is not a discrete sequential
manipulator of static representational structures” (1995: p. 3). Similarly, embodied
dynamicists, Rolf Pfeiffer and Christian Scheier, criticised the “analogy between human
17

The label ‘extreme dynamicism’ is used to alert the reader that in some sense, any cognitive scientist is by
definition a dynamicist. For there seems to be a consensus that cognition is a dynamical phenomenon, and as
such it requires some application of dynamical systems theory. So, for clarity, the label ‘extreme
dynamicism’ is chosen to denote the anti-computationalist position.
18
To be sure, these different approaches are logically autonomous. One can subscribe to any particular approach
without necessarily subscribing to the others. For a nice discussion on the history and differences amongst
those approaches see, for example, Evan Thomson (2007: pp. 3-15).
19
More precisely, Brooks only rejects what I dubbed extrinsic representations for the computations performed
by these mobots. “[T]here need be no explicit representation of either the world or the intentions of the
system” (Brooks 1991: p. 149).
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thinking and processes running in a computer, that is, information processing as the
manipulation of symbols” (1999: p. 47).
Researchers endorsing one (or more) of these approaches have rejected the cognitivist
paradigm, which gives rise to some form of a “Cartesian theater” (Spivey 2007: p. 313) and
relies on a metaphor of the “mind as a computer” (ibid: p. 29). Still, the common
interpretation of a computer is as a serial digital system (ibid; Wallace et al. 2007: p. 10;
Froese 2011: p. 118) that performs information processing on representations (Wallace et al.
2007: p. 10; Thomson 2007: p. 186). For the extreme dynamicist, representation is not a
mandatory concept for explaining cognitive phenomena, which are seen as the simultaneous,
mutually influencing unfolding of complex temporal structures. The digital computationalist,
on the other hand, supposedly explains cognitive phenomena as simple transformations of
static representations (Thelen and Smith 1994: pp. 164-165; van Gelder 1998: pp. 621-622).
It seems then that advocates of the various extreme dynamical approaches share a common
(mis)conception of computation. This conception leads them to reject computational research
programs in cognitive science. Rather than relying on computer science as the foundation for
traditional cognitive science, they promote dynamical systems theory as the foundation for an
alternative cognitive science. For dynamical systems theory provides a general mathematical
theory (which supposedly is already the standard language of the natural sciences) and it
allows us to do better justice than computability theory to the continuous temporal changes of
cognitive phenomena at multiple timescales (Froese 2011).
Moreover, extreme dynamicists take computation to be a serially digital process that is
carried out over extrinsic representations. Yet, Gandy machines, cellular automata and
(discrete) connectionist networks, perform parallel digital computation and violate this
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narrow characterisation. As well, computational neuroscience invokes the notion of neural
computation that is (possibly) different than digital computation proper. Further, the assertion
that digital computation is carried out over extrinsic representation is unsupported. Symbolic
computation is merely a narrow class of digital computation. So, the dynamicist rejection of
“information-processing on representations” as the basis of an adequate model of cognition
only applies to models that are based on, say, the FSM and PSS accounts. However, broad
digital computationalism is not susceptible to a similar criticism.
Extreme dynamicism is advanced as a non-computational more biologically plausible
framework. Nevertheless, it is not obvious why this is the case, as extreme dynamicists tend
to ignore the practical details of the underlying mechanisms of the cognitive systems in
question. That brings us to the next section.
7

Mechanistic vs. Non-Mechanistic Explanatory Frameworks

Before turning to evaluate whether dynamicism, connectionism and digital computationalism
should be viewed as competing or complementary frameworks, let us briefly examine the
main aspects of mechanistic explanations. Mechanisms typically have four characteristics:
phenomenal, componential, causal and organisational. First, they are phenomenal in the sense
that they perform tasks.20 The phenomenon is explained by appealing to the tasks performed
as a whole and it partially determines the boundaries of the mechanism. Second, all
mechanisms have at least two components. The components of a mechanism are those that
are relevant to the explanandum. Third, these components are causally interrelated, that is,
they interact with one another. Four, the spatial organisation of the components (in terms of
their locations, shapes, orientations, etc.) as well as their temporal organisation (in terms of
20

I follow Carl Craver and William Bechtel in labelling this characteristic ‘phenomenal’ in a manner unrelated
to phenomenology (2006: p. 469).
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the order, rates, and durations of the activities in the mechanism) play a key role in generating
the phenomenon (Craver and Bechtel 2006: pp. 469-470).
Moreover, a mechanistic explanation requires isolating some aspect of the phenomenon to
be explained and positing a mechanism that is capable of producing this phenomenon. A
mechanistic explanation of a system is achieved by virtue of identifying the relevant
subcomponents of the mechanism and the corresponding activities (i.e., localisation) that are
organised in the right way so as to produce the phenomenon in question. The localisation of
the relevant components and corresponding activities is accomplished by means of structural
and functional decomposition respectively. A structural decomposition begins by breaking
the mechanism apart into subcomponents and then investigating what they do. A functional
decomposition is accomplished by analysing the phenomenon into activities that, when
properly organised, exhibit the phenomenon. For example, the chemical process of
fermentation may be decomposed into a set of more basic chemical reactions, including
oxidation and phosphorylation (ibid: p. 473).
In the context of mechanistic explanations a distinction is typically made between
mechanistic sketches (or mechanistic schemata) and complete mechanistic models. A
mechanistic sketch (or scheme) is a functional analysis in which some structural details of a
mechanistic explanation are excluded. But once the omitted details are filled in, the
functional analysis becomes a full-blown mechanistic explanation. A complete mechanistic
model identifies the functional properties of the components and must respect constraints
imposed by those components. It also does not leave any crucial gaps regarding how the
mechanism works (Piccinini and Craver 2011). With this brief exposition in mind, let us
return

to

examine

the

relation

among
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dynamicism,

connectionism

and

digital

computationalism as explanatory frameworks.
Recently, some devoted dynamicists have argued that (good) dynamical accounts of
cognitive phenomena are genuinely explanatory and not merely descriptive (Stepp et al.
2011). This defence was invoked in response to the contemporary mechanistic philosophy of
science that allegedly excludes dynamicists’ explanations of cognition (Machamer 2004;
Bechtel 2009; Piccinini and Craver 2011). According to the defenders, the reason for this
exclusion results from either a theoretical commitment to computational explanations or a
normative commitment to a mechanistic philosophy of science. Instead of proposing a
complete mechanistic explanation, dynamical explanations seek to model cognitive
phenomena by identifying higher-level laws (or law-like principles). Dynamical explanations
capture the temporal change of the phenomenon in question by a set of differential equations
(Stepp et al. 2011: p. 432).
Other authors have argued that some dynamical explanations are mechanistic. Arguably
the fact that dynamical explanations use mathematical tools and concepts of dynamical
systems theory does not entail that these explanations are non-mechanistic. On this view,
(extreme) dynamicism can also sometimes be used to describe cognitive mechanisms. Carlos
Zednik offers two examples that supposedly show that dynamical models and dynamical
analyses are in themselves mechanistic throughout (2011). The first one is the infant
perseverative reaching model by Esther Thelen and colleagues based on Jean Piaget’s classic
A-not-B task. What Zednik identifies as most significant for his claim is a tripartite analysis
of an input vector, which partakes in this dynamical explanation, into a task input, a trialspecific input and a memory trace, which captures the influence of prior trials. The individual
contributions of the task input, trial-specific input and memory trace can be supposedly
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construed as the posited component operations of a mechanism for goal-directed reaching.
Expressed as variables, these operations are linked in a dynamical equation that captures their
role in this mechanism (ibid: pp. 248-249).
The second example is Randall Beer’s dynamical explanation of perceptual categorisation
in a simulated brain-body-environment system. The simulated system consists of a single
minimally cognitive agent, which is equipped with a 14-neuron continuous-time recurrent
connectionist network “brain”. The system is situated in a simple two-dimensional
environment, which features a single circular or diamond-shaped object. This object falls
vertically toward the agent in the course of the trial, and the agent responds by moving
horizontally to catch circles and avoid diamonds, thereby performing a categorical
discrimination. By Zednik’s lights, Beer’s dynamical explanation features a dynamical
analysis that describes the activity of two components, the embodied “brain” and the
environment (ibid: pp. 250-252).
Nevertheless, these two examples do not show that extreme dynamicism offers a
mechanistic explanation. They rather show that it is compatible with mechanistic cognitive
models. Zednik argues that Beer’s dynamical analysis relies on the mechanistic heuristic of
structural decomposition to identify two components, the embodied brain and the
environment. The operations associated with each of the components are described by a
detailed dynamical analysis. By doing so, Zednik puts a foot on a slippery slope. For once we
allow such simple structural decomposition, any dynamicist explanation, which describes the
interaction between a cognitive agent and the environment, is supposedly mechanistic. Beer’s
model is mechanistic, but only because it includes a connectionist network, which models a
part of the brain. His dynamical analysis complements the connectionist network model.
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The infant perservative reaching model also does not support the claim that some
dynamical models are mechanistic proper. Zednik implies that this model can be considered a
relatively abstract mechanistic sketch, which leaves more than enough room for elaborating
the possible neuroanatomical components giving rise to the goal-directed reaching
phenomenon. At best, this model offers a functional decomposition of low-level processes of
perception and action (ibid: pp. 249-250). Even if it were classified as an “abstract
mechanistic sketch”, it would be at the “very incomplete” end of the spectrum. For, it lacks
any structural decomposition of the underlying relevant components. Absent the
identification of the participating components, any possible causal relations among them
cannot be specified. As an incomplete mechanistic sketch, this model indeed invites a future
development of a mechanistic explanation. Yet, there remains a big gap to be filled, as the
model has to identify the causal structure of the system in question (Piccinini and Craver
2011: p. 292).
A dynamical explanation should not be misconceived as an alternative to mechanistic
explanations. The Hodgkin-Huxley model of spike generation is arguably a good example of
a genuine explanation. Still, it simultaneously offers a dynamical description (comprising a
set of coupled differential equations to describe the dynamics of the membrane action
potential) and a mechanistic one (describing how ion channels and related activities are
organised to generate action potentials). These differential equations helped guide the search
for the underlying components of the responsible mechanism (Kaplan and Bechtel 2011: p.
439).
It is the non-mechanistic dynamical approach that offers a genuinely different kind of
cognitive science. Such an approach is not on a par with either connectionism or digital
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computationalism. But whether this approach is truly explanatory or merely descriptive
remains contentious. The burden of proof is on the extreme dynamicist to show how her
approach is explanatory in the absence of a mechanistic description. Predictions based on
law-like regularities are at best incomplete explanations.
Whilst digital computationalism and connectionism also make available physical models
of cognitive architectures, dynamicism proper offers a mathematical formalism describing the
evolution of complex physical systems over time. Classicism and connectionism, for
instance, may be competing for the same prize. But not dynamicism, as it provides a
completely different type of epistemological analysis with a different purpose than the
modelling one served by the other two. Whether cognition turns out to be a programmable
digital computing system, a continuous recurrent network, both or neither, has no critical
implications for dynamicism. If we endorse the view defended by Zednik, then some
dynamical analyses may be considered incomplete mechanistic sketches. Still, as incomplete
sketches they have to be elaborated by means of structural decomposition. Typically,
dynamical analyses are complemented by connectionist networks in an attempt to identify the
relevant subcomponents generating the cognitive phenomenon.
Nevertheless, dynamicism proper is a non-mechanistic explanatory framework. It explains
cognitive phenomena in one of three ways: metaphorically, using a small number of variables
or using connectionist models (Thagard 2005: pp. 200-203). When not all influencing
variables can be identified and the equations cannot be spelled out, dynamicists describe
cognition metaphorically. But a metaphor only goes so far as an explanation. In other cases,
where a small number of variables can be identified, dynamicism provides a mathematical
description of the overall system state and its predicted changes under certain conditions.
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When connectionist networks are employed, dynamicism offers a mathematical framework
for analysing the workings of these networks (revealing the overlap between dynamicism and
connectionism).
“Radical” dynamicism, in particular, rejects the need to identify the various parts
comprising the overall cognitive system and their organisation in a manner that contributes to
the overall system activity. It thereby violates the decomposition principle (Bechtel 1998a,
1998b). “Radical” dynamicists seek to identify the laws governing the “highest level relevant
to an explanation of cognitive performances, whatever that may be” (van Gelder 1998: p.
619).
By contrast, connectionism and digital computationalism provide a mechanistic
explanation of cognition. Models of cognitive architecture are available within each of these
paradigms (yet, classicists downplay the importance of the particular physical
implementation). There is certainly little reason to insist on a narrow view of
computationalism as the basis for computational cognitive science21. But if we adopt a broad
view of digital computationalism (say, one that follows from either the algorithmic execution
account or the mechanistic account of computation) instead, then the result is a mechanistic
explanation of cognition.
Some authors have recently rejected the view that digital computationalism and
connectionism are mechanistic cognitive models. For instance, Daniel Weiskopf argues that
though they have some features in common with mechanistic models proper, they crucially
differ in the manner in which they relate to the modelled cognitive system (2011: p. 314). By
his lights, cognitive models are causally structured, componentially organised, and

21

Cf. Hubert Dreyfus (1972), Searle (1980) and Steven Horst (1999) to name just a few critics of classicism.
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semantically interpretable. Such cognitive models can be specified at different levels of
analysis in a similar manner to full-blown mechanistic models (ibid: p. 327). However, the
objection continues, cognitive models need not be mechanistic to be genuinely explanatory.
For there need not always be a one-to-one correspondence of every component of the
cognitive model to some real entity in the modelled system.
Whilst some cognitive models may be genuinely explanatory, if a one-to-one
correspondence does not obtain, then, by the mechanistic standards, they are supposedly
inadequate. In some cognitive models, which offer functional layered analyses, what matters
is that there is some stable pattern of organisation in the brain that carries out the appropriate
processes assigned to each layer of analysis, and has the appropriate sort of causal
organisation. For example, there could be a correspondence to a whole set of resources
possessed by neural regions, rather than, say, individual neurons.22 Yet, if a simple
correspondence among components of the cognitive model and some neural entities in the
brain does not obtain, then the model is at best incomplete, and at worst false (ibid: pp. 329330).
The gist of the objection is that whilst digital computationalist and connectionist models
are both componential and causal, they need not necessarily be mechanistic. For these
models often posit elements that do not straightforwardly map onto localised parts of the
modelled cognitive system (ibid: p. 332). However, as Weiskopf acknowledges himself, this
objection may be countered by distinguishing between mechanistic sketches and complete

22

Weiskopf cites some researchers corroborating this claim. For example:
“[P]sychological primitives are functional abstractions for brain networks that contribute to the formation of
neuronal assemblies that make up each brain state” (Lisa Barrett, as cited by Weiskopf 2011: p. 330).
“Almost every cognitive task involves the activation of a network of brain regions (say, 4-10 per
hemisphere) rather than a single area” (Marcel Just et al, as cited by Weiskopf 2011: p. 330).
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mechanistic models.
Connectionism typically offers cognitive explanations in terms of neural networks that
need not correspond to networks of real brain neurons and synapses. A single artificial neural
unit may correspond to a single region in the brain instead. Connectionist networks
implement a task analysis without necessarily decomposing their overall operation into
intelligible subtasks performed by individual components (i.e., units), which correspond to
either individual brain neurons or regions. Connectionist modellers typically build their
network as mechanistic models, yet they cannot give a complete mechanistic analysis of the
microfeatures and microactivities that result from its adaptive weight changes during learning
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen: p. 268).
Moreover, connectionist networks explain cognitive phenomena without employing
localisation and decomposition. The overall performance of the network is typically not
decomposable into intelligible subtasks. Instead, such networks emaphasise dynamic
behaviour that corresponds to the cognitive activity to be explained without the
subcomponents of the system performing recognisable subtasks of the overall task. Each one
of these subtasks is distributed across the layers of network and cannot be straightforwardly
localised in any individual unit. In the absence of explicit rules connectionist networks have
structures that are found in the networks’ connections (Bechtel and Richardson 2010: pp.
217, 222-223). Yet, these networks are, at the very least, mechanistic sketches.
Why are digital computationalist models mechanistic? In digital computationalist models,
functional decomposition is accomplished by modelling the target cognitive phenomenon
through a series of algorithmic operations. In principle, it is easier in (non-connectionist)
computational models to localise individual operations in corresponding components, due

35

to the nature of these models. Conventional digital computing systems are typically driven by
an explicit set of rules (cf. the mechanistic account or the algorithm execution account and
even the FSM and PSS accounts). Data (or symbols, on the classicist view) are manipulated
by either hard- or soft-programmed instructions. For the purposes of classifying digital
computationalist models as mechanistic, these instructions that manipulate data (or symbols)
embody an attempt to account for the performance of the modelled cognitive system by way
of decomposing the overall task into simpler subtasks.
Consider, for example, Marr’s model of vision and John Anderson’s ACT* production
model. At the computational level, Marr’s analysis specifies what is being computed and
why. At the algorithmic level, the visual system is specified by means of the representations
being used as well as the algorithm for transforming inputs to outputs. This level provides an
explanation of the structure of visual processes. The implementation level specifies the
physical realisation of the representations and algorithm (Marr 1982). Marr’s tripartite
model attempted to identify individual operations with specific neuroanatomical structures23
(i.e., localising the detection of zero-crossings in cortical simple cells). Anderson’s ACT*
production model analyses cognitive memory function while also providing a cognitive
architecture. This model consists of three components: working memory, declarative (or
explicit) memory and production (or implicit) memory. This model exhibits the performance
of an action as loop of encoding (into working memory), match (against a rule in production
memory) and execution (in working memory) (Anderson 1983).
These computationalist models assume that the modelled mental activity is decomposable

23

Piccinini and Craver argue that Marr’s three levels are not levels of mechanism, since they do not describe
relations among components or subcomponents (2011: p. 303). On their interpretation, the computational and
algorithmic levels are mechanistic sketches. The computational level describes the mechanism’s task and the
algorithmic level describes the computational vehicles as well as the processes that manipulate these vehicles.

36

into a set of operations, each of which is governed by a set of instructions operating on
representations (Bechtel and Richardson 2010: pp. 211-212). If a computationalist model also
specifies how the relevant components are realised by neuroanatomical structures, then, by
the standards of mechanistic explanation, it is a complete mechanistic model. Yet, such a
direct localisation is not always practical.
Not all advocates of dynamicism share the view of it being an alternative to
connectionism and computationalism broadly (hence the label ‘extreme dynamicism’ is used
above to denote a narrower subclass of dynamicism). Beer, for one, denies the extreme
dynamicist thesis that cognitive systems are best understood only using the tools of
dynamical systems theory (forthcoming). He asserts that there is no useful mathematical
distinction to be drawn among dynamicism, connectionism and (digital) computationalism.
For, on the one hand, all dynamical systems can be approximated by TMs and, on the other,
TMs defined over the real numbers are equivalent to dynamical systems. Similarly, recurrent
neural nets can approximate arbitrary dynamical systems. He also acknowledges that it is
probable that connectionism, (digital) computationalism and dynamicism will all be
important in any future theory of cognition.
Yet, any mathematical distinctions aside, the mechanistic challenge remains unanswered.
Connectionism and digital computationalism also make available models of cognitive
architecture besides the mathematical toolbox that comes with the theory, but dynamicism
proper does not. Digital computationalism need not be limited only to a specific formalism of
computability, such as TMs or the lambda calculus. Formalisms of computability provide the
mathematical tools required for determining the plausibility of computational level theories.
Still, any particular formalism does not specify the relationship between abstract and
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concrete computation. An algorithm formally specifies the relations between inputs and
outputs and it can run on digital computers of various architectures. Any (classical) algorithm
can (in principle) be executed on some TM. However, a TM is merely an idealisation and
does not specify the physical mechanism(s) by which the algorithm is executed.
Moreover, it is at the physical level that the algorithm is converted to a program and bound
by the implementing physical system. An algorithm can, in principle, produce all the natural
numbers by iteratively invoking the successor function starting from 0. However, a program
that implements that algorithm will eventually fail when it runs out of physical memory. TMs
may help us determine whether an algorithm can be implemented on a digital computing
system. But it is at the level of the physical implementation that the actual operations are
analysed in consideration of the physical architecture and the primitive operations supported
as well as the “real time” speed of the executed program (as opposed to the number of
discrete steps in a TM). And if cognition is an embodied biological phenomenon (as granted
by the dynamicist), it is concrete computation that plays a key role in explaining cognition
and not just computability theory.
As observed above, dynamicism and mechanistic computational explanations are
complementary. Understanding a particular mechanism but not its role in the overall
dynamics of the cognitive agent (and perhaps the environment) is insufficient. Identifying a
clock mechanism, for instance, in a physical computing system without discovering how it
affects and is affected by the overall operation of the system only provides a partial
explanation. And conversely, understanding the dynamics of the cognitive agents without
identifying their constituent components provides a limited explanation at best.
This complementarity principle has yielded some collaborative effort in computational
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neuroscience where an understanding of single neurons is supplemented by dynamicism. For
instance, Eugene Izhikevich has applied dynamical systems theory tools in studying the
relationship among electrophysiology, bifurcations and computational properties of neurons
(2007). Chris Eliasmith and Charles Anderson have introduced a framework for the study of
cognition in which computation, representation and dynamical systems theory all play a role
(2003). They argue that modern control theory is better suited than computability theory for
understanding cognition as a biological system. According to their theory, neural
computation is the transformation of neural representations.
It certainly seems plausible that cognitive science has much to gain by adopting a broad
perspective, which sees the above paradigms as complementary. A bottom up strategy alone
will face significant challenges trying to explain how low level mechanisms give rise to highlevel cognitive phenomena. A purely top down strategy may yield a viable story that explains
certain phenomena without establishing how they are grounded in the human biological
substrate. But such a story is difficult to conclusively refute. Still, cognitive science that
draws on each of these strategies simultaneously is more likely to overcome those challenges.
Time will tell.
8

Conclusion

Cognitive science faces the nontrivial task of explaining cognition. Even setting aside the
question of what consciousness is or how it fits in the whole story, human cognition remains
largely unexplained. As soon as it seemed that computation might help us in explaining
cognition, computation became foundational to the scientific enquiry. But when we are not
even clear on what computation is precisely matters only get worse. Sections 3-5 illustrate
how three research programs in cognitive science invoke computation differently for
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explaining cognition. Section 6 illustrates how a particular construal of computation leads
another research program to dismiss it as playing a key role in cognitive science.
I have argued for enhanced clarity on how computation is invoked for explaining
cognition. A blanket dismissal of the key role computation plays in cognitive science is
unwarranted.

Even

if

classicism,

for

example,

were

found

untenable,

digital

computationalism could still survive. Moreover, by invoking computation as the basis for
their explanatory frameworks, digital computationalism and connectionism gain not only
(possible) competence level theories capitalising on mathematical formalisms, but potentially
also physical cognitive architectures (or performance level theories). Dynamicism has to be
complemented to provide a (complete) mechanistic explanation (see section 7 above).
Computation is a general notion that offers great flexibility and its lure for explaining
cognition is obvious. However, it comes at the cost of equivocation. When one makes
assertions about cognition being computational (or not), one should also explicate what
particular notion of computation is employed.
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